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1. Introduction
Participation in investment markets has steadily shifted
away from individuals and toward institutions. With
93% of U.S. equity directly held by individuals in
1950, this figure was estimated to be as low as 25%
by 2009.1 At the same time, households’ holdings of
funds has risen from a mere 3% in 2000 to 23% of
their total financial assets in 2010, with mutual funds
consequently owning 27% of all U.S. equity, 45% of all
commercial paper, and 11% of U.S. Treasury securities.2
Although there is no doubt that the participation of
delegated portfolio managers who invest for others is
one of the key characteristics of both modern equity
and debt markets, it remains an open question, and a
subject of a growing literature, how delegation impacts
asset prices and market efficiency.
1 See ABA Business Law Section: Corporate Governance Com-
mittee (2009).
2 Except when specified, all data reported in this introduction are
taken from the 2011 Investment Company Fact Book (Investment
Company Institute 2011).
In this paper, we explore the consequences for asset
prices and allocations of competition between port-
folio managers within a stylized general equilibrium
framework, and we offer experimental evidence on the
key principles underlying our theory. Absent delega-
tion, the setup is one that had been tested extensively
in the laboratory and the experiments had provided
robust support for the theory (Asparouhova et al.
2003, Bossaerts and Plott 2004, Bossaerts et al. 2007).
As such, there exists a solid benchmark against which
to calibrate an experiment with delegation.
Investors in the real world have choices of both direct
and indirect investment. To cleanly isolate the effects of
delegation and competition, we shut down the direct
investment channel: our investors hold securities, but
they cannot directly trade. Instead, they need to engage
managers to trade on their behalf. Managers each offer
a portfolio contract and stand ready to deliver any
number of units of it in exchange for a fixed fee per
unit. Importantly, managers compete for investors, and
investors can hold contracts from multiple managers.
We are interested in what portfolios managers offer,
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what portfolios investors choose, and what asset prices
emerge in the intermanager market.
To further simplify our theory and experiment, we
consider an environment where both skill and informa-
tion are homogeneous across managers. We also assume
a basic fee structure, stripping out complications, even
at the cost of reducing realism. We do not doubt the
importance of skill and informational advantage that
some managers may possess. Nor do we underesti-
mate the impact of more complex fee structures. Still,
even with added realism, the research question would
continue to be about the effects of competition for fund
flows, and the layers of complexity one would have to
add to accommodate skill or information advantages
or to make fee structure more realistic would only
make it more difficult to isolate the specific impact of
manager competition on prices and allocations.
Much of the existing literature has focused on con-
tract design in the resolution of the conflicts of inter-
est between investors and (heterogeneously skilled
or informed) portfolio managers (Bhattacharya and
Pfleiderer 1985, Stoughton 1993, Heinkel and Stoughton
1994, Ou-Yang 2003, Cadenillas et al. 2007, Dybvig et al.
2010). Another strand takes as given the conflicts of
interest and their imperfect resolution (e.g., through
benchmarking), and studies the impact on market
behavior (Brennan 1993, Cornell and Roll 2005, Cuoco
and Kaniel 2011). Our approach differs from both in
that we do not consider the relationship between man-
ager and investor as one to one (between a principal
investor and agent manager). Instead, in our approach,
the relationship may be many to many: investors may
engage several managers, and managers may offer
services to multiple investors.
As a result, our theory is essentially an extension
to delegated portfolio management of the analysis of
competition in contracts pioneered by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). Our application goes one step further,
though: it not only analyzes what contracts will emerge
in equilibrium, but also whether pricing in the securities
markets is affected because portfolio management is
delegated. Our equilibrium notion is thus closely related
to that of Zame (2007), who investigates the interaction
between, on the one hand, prices in markets for goods
and, on the other hand, competition between contracts
that arrange the production of the goods to be supplied
to these markets. There are a number of reasons why
we follow the tradition of competitive analysis of
contracts. First, it provides a manageable notion of
competitive equilibrium. Second, in the field, there
is plenty of casual support for its main predictions.3
3 In the context of lending under adverse selection, for instance, this
theory anticipated the inevitability of zero-deductible insurance
contracts or zero-down payment “subprime” loan contracts, and it
explained why banks could at times be casual about creditworthiness
checks (because risks could easily be inferred from contract choice).
Third, these and other predictions have recently been
confirmed in experimental testing (Asparouhova 2006).
Berk and Green (2004) also consider competition
between fund managers, but their model focuses on fee
competition in the face of learnable talent differences.
Closer to our analysis, Agranov et al. (2010) investigate
strategic portfolio choices when two managers Bertrand
compete for a single investor’s money. Our setting
is competitive: managers may enter freely and may
attract multiple investors. Moreover, Agranov et al.
(2010) does not study the consequences for pricing in
the intermanager market.
Our theory adds delegation to the standard asset pric-
ing model in finance. In the standard model, investors
engage directly with the market. Investors are risk
averse, and hence equilibrium prices and allocations
reflect investors’ desire to smooth wealth across states.
In equilibrium, investors hold well-diversified port-
folios, and, provided markets are complete, the price
of insurance against poor states (relative to the corre-
sponding state probability) is larger than that in rich
states. In other words, state price–probability ratios are
inversely related to aggregate wealth across states.4 This
standard equilibrium pricing result will be referred to
as the weak capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
We first introduce delegation as follows. Fund man-
agers compete for investors who hand over part of
their wealth, and obtain shares proportional to the
value of the assets handed over. Investors compensate
managers with a nominal fee also proportional to the
value of the contributed assets. This base setup, how-
ever, leads to unsatisfactory predictions because a wide
variety of choice patterns (investor choice of managers
and manager choice of portfolios) are consistent with
equilibrium. To sharpen predictions, we add a limited
liability provision: investors are liable for the fee only
to the extent that the manager’s final portfolio value
covers it. The result is that managers now compete
to reduce the effective fee paid by investors. Sharp
equilibrium predictions ensue. Managers will pattern
their portfolios to mimic AD securities and investors
obtain diversification by investing in many managers
simultaneously. This “homemade” diversification even-
tually is reflected in pricing: prices in the intermanager
asset market are identical to those in the standard
model (weak CAPM obtains), except for a lower risk
premium.
There is a problem with implementation of the above
scenario, however. Both fees and shares in a manager’s
fund are determined by the value of the assets an
4 Uncertainty in an economy is represented by states of the world.
States differ in that they entail varying aggregate or private wealth.
The price of a state is the value of claims to state-contingent payoffs
referred to as Arrow–Debreu (AD) securities. An AD security for
state s pays one unit of cash in state s and 0 in all other states.
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investor contributes. Computation of value requires
asset prices, which do not become available until the
intermanager market opens. To avoid having to guess
prices, and inspired by practice in the field, we study a
variation of our theory where the share in a fund (and
resulting fees) is determined by expected final payoffs.
In this case the weak CAPM still obtains under mild
additional assumptions on investor initial allocations.
We report the results of a large-scale experi-
ment designed to test the predictions of our theory.
The design closely followed that of earlier experiments
that had reliably generated weak CAPM pricing in
the absence of portfolio delegation (Asparouhova et al.
2003, Bossaerts and Plott 2004, Bossaerts et al. 2007).
During all replications, 32 subjects participated as
managers. On average, 70 subjects participated as
investors (not all investors were the same across replica-
tions). At the start of each replication, investor subjects
(investors) allocated their initial endowment to man-
ager subjects (managers). Managers could then trade
the assets, during a certain time, through anonymous,
online, continuous open-book markets. When trading
concluded, investors were paid their share of the liqui-
dating fund payoff, net of fees. Managers received a
payment proportional to the expected payoff of initial
contributions, although investors’ obligation to pay
the fee was limited by the final value of a manager’s
portfolio. Basic performance indices were reported,
investors were given new endowments of securities
and cash, and a new replication started. This process
was replicated six times (over six “periods”).
Consistent with the theory, we found strong evidence
that investors preferred managers whose portfolios
mimicked more closely AD securities. Still, investor
choices were also partly determined by performance
in the immediate past. Over time, these two elements
contributed to increased concentration of wealth across
managers. Price dynamics appeared to be driven by
the weak CAPM, but pricing quality was negatively
affected as fund concentration increased. In contrast to
manager portfolios, which became more “polarized”
over time (better mimicked AD securities), investor
portfolios (of manager funds) were well diversified.
In sum, our results are suggestive that competi-
tion between fund managers along with the ability of
investors to distribute wealth across multiple funds
preserve the main predictions of asset pricing theory
because investors can engage in homemade diversifica-
tion, and hence prices continue to reflect the demand
for diversification on which the (weak) CAPM is based.
Managers do not offer portfolios that are optimal on
their own; managers instead specialize in providing
components of optimal portfolios if this is advanta-
geous to investors. Our experiment corroborated the
theoretical developments. From a policy point of view,
our theory advises that competition be encouraged in
the mutual fund industry, by allowing investors access
to multiple fund managers and ensuring free entry.
At the market level, this not only improves competition,
but it also enhances price quality, as is clear from
our experimental results. To foster investors’ effective
benefit from fund markets, the use of fund performance
measures that assume that the investor can only acquire
shares in a single fund (e.g., Sharpe ratios) should be
discouraged. Our theory (and experiment) illustrates
this in an extreme fashion: it is optimal for managers
(and their customers agree) to take huge risks, namely,
to promise payouts in only one state, as if betting that
only one state will occur. Finally, in a competitive fund
industry, management compensation schemes may
distort incentives less than previously thought because
managers compete for patronage in another dimension,
namely, composition of the portfolios they offer.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides further motivation for the structure
behind our theory and our experiment. The theory
is developed in §3. Section 4 presents details of the
experimental design. Section 5 discusses the results,
and §6 concludes.
2. Motivating the Theory
Before presenting our theory, we elaborate on some
of the issues raised in the introduction concerning its
approach and its scope.
We focus on aspects of delegated portfolio manage-
ment that have not been investigated much, yet may be
important drivers of outcomes as we see them in the
real world. Specifically, we study here the consequences
of the ability of investors to allocate wealth across
several managers, and of the need for managers to
compete with others for the patronage of investors.
We deliberately limit the scope, isolating the forces we
choose to focus on, to understand and experimentally
corroborate the impact of these forces on outcomes.
Furthermore, we insist on studying not only pricing,
but, perhaps more importantly, choices (of investors
and managers). Whereas much empirical work ana-
lyzes only prices because choice data are often absent
in historical data, our experimental approach affords
equal access to prices and choices. To make the exer-
cise meaningful, we introduce forces so that choice
predictions become sharp.
With these considerations in mind, we first discuss
the general environment. Subsequently, we introduce
the necessary refinements that generate sharper choice
predictions. Finally, we present modifications that
facilitate laboratory testing of the theory.
2.1. The Environment
We envisage a situation where investors face both
idiosyncratic and aggregate risk in a one-period invest-
ment setting. Investors are not allowed to manage
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their own wealth; they are required to delegate its
management to one or several funds, for a fee. Specif-
ically, today (t = 0), investors can acquire contracts
offered by investment managers so that their payoff
tomorrow (at t = 1) has a desirable distribution of
risk. Managers supply the contracts demanded by
investors through trading in a complete set of financial
markets. They use the resources entrusted to them
by the investors to pay for the securities that could
provide the promised payoff distribution. Resources
consist of a portfolio of state-contingent AD claims.
We assume that the investors are risk averse and have
a concave utility over wealth tomorrow and maximize
the expected value of that utility today. Managers are
assumed to be risk neutral and only care about the
payment they receive from investors in the form of
a management fee. The fee owed to a manager and
shares held in a fund are proportional to the value of
assets entrusted with that manager.
This baseline setting allows us to readily make sharp
predictions about asset prices, but choices (of investors
and managers) are far less constrained, certainly in a
setting where one does not control or even observe
risk aversion.5 Moreover, in this baseline scenario, fees
and shares depend on an endogenous variable, namely,
the value of assets entrusted by the investor. We next
motivate refinements on the baseline that generate
sharper choice predictions and facilitate experimental
implementation.
2.2. Investor Preferences
It is tradition in finance to restrict preferences to gener-
ate asset pricing restrictions that lead to convenient
statistical tests on historical data. The CAPM, for
instance, assumes quadratic utility, and can readily
be tested by checking the significance of intercepts in
least-squares projections of historical average excess
returns of individual assets/portfolios onto those of a
market benchmark. The spirit of the main parametric
asset pricing models, however, carries over to more
general models. All models somehow restrict returns,
and hence prices, as a function of the covariance (across
states) between asset payoffs and aggregate wealth.
We shall refer to the general restrictions as the “weak
CAPM.” The general restrictions are hard to test on
historical data, because relevant states have to be spec-
ified unambiguously, their probabilities have to be
assessed, and aggregate wealth in each of them has
to be identified. In an experimental setting, in con-
trast, states, their probabilities, and their aggregate
wealth are set by the experimenter, and hence form
part of experimental control. Therefore, we can aim for
5 In experiments risk aversion is only observed indirectly, through
choices. But inferring risk attitudes from choices requires one to
know the right choice predictions.
general asset pricing restrictions, obviating the need
to make (potentially unrealistic) assumptions about
preferences. Nevertheless, in the supplemental online
material (available at http://uleef.business.utah.edu/
SOM/ManSci2014/SOM.pdf), we discuss how and
when more popular parametric asset pricing equations,
in particular the (strict) CAPM, obtain.
2.3. Manager Competition
In our baseline environment, a multitude of choice sce-
narios support the pricing predictions. Investor choices
could be exactly pinned down if we had information
on investor preferences (risk aversion). However, even
in such an idealized scenario, we would still have
multiple manager choices consistent with equilibrium
pricing predictions.
We thus add restrictions that induce a form of com-
petition with strong implications for equilibrium choice
of managerial contracts, while inducing transparent
incentives for investors in their choices of managers
regardless of how risk averse they are, and while
keeping intact the pricing implications. Specifically, we
provide investors with limited liability for fees: they
are liable for fees to a manager only to the extent
that the final value of this manager’s contract covers
the fees. Limited liability renders manager payment
more realistic than in the baseline because fees become
correlated with manager performance across states of
the world. Indeed, real-world fee schemes typically do
change over time, if only because the value of assets
under management fluctuates, and hence manager
compensation is state dependent.
Limited liability introduces a specific form of compe-
tition among managers since they can offer contracts
that allow investors to save on fees in some states of
the world. It is an alternative to direct fee competi-
tion that is advantageous for experimental purposes.
In our setting, if managers were allowed to choose fees,
competition would force fees down to zero. As a conse-
quence, subjects who play the role of manager would
become disincentivized. Without proper incentives, we
cannot expect manager subjects to compete aggressively
in a (for this study) more important dimension, namely,
portfolio composition. In any event, direct fee competi-
tion would not solve the problem of multiplicity of the
type of contracts offered by managers in equilibrium.
Unlike competition in fees, limited liability allows
managers to earn positive profits in equilibrium, and
hence provides the right incentives to manager subjects.
A further experimental rationale for limited liabil-
ity is that it prevents investors from going bankrupt.
Bankruptcy has distorting effects on experimental stud-
ies since human subject protection protocol prohibits
experimenters from enforcing negative earnings, thus
effectively truncating the distribution of earnings from
below.
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2.4. Manager-Subject Preferences
With limited liability, fee income becomes potentially
state dependent, and hence we need to worry about
risk attitudes of manager subjects. Our theory assumes
that managers are risk neutral. Yet, ample evidence
exists that subjects are averse to risk in the laboratory
(as mentioned before), and therefore choices of man-
ager subjects would be different from those under risk
neutrality if fees are state dependent. In the experiment,
we addressed this issue by bailing out the managers
whenever their portfolio value did not cover fees. As a
result, manager income became state independent and
hence risk free (whereas investor income generally
remained state dependent), so manager risk aversion
was of no consequence. Predicted outcomes are the
same as if fee income were state dependent and man-
agers were risk neutral. Optimal choices of investor
subjects are unaltered.
2.5. Share and Fee Determination
In the baseline scenario, investors hand over to the
chosen managers assets with a worth sufficient for
managers to trade to the contractually promised port-
folios. The worth is valued at intermanager market
prices. Unfortunately, these prices are unavailable at the
moment the investors make their choices of managers.
The field suggests a practical way to solve this
problem while at the same time illustrating that the
solution is not perfect. Consider a new investor who
contributes cash to an existing fund. Shares are tradi-
tionally assigned based on the value of all assets (both
already in the fund and contributed) at the close of the
market after contribution. Consider the fraction of the
manager’s portfolio that the contributed cash will buy
if stock prices increase the subsequent day when the
manager aims for a particular portfolio composition,
say, an equally weighted index of two types of com-
mon shares. This fraction will be lower than the share
allocated to the new investor, which was based on
the lower stock prices at the close the previous day.6
Conversely, the cash contribution of the new investor
will buy a higher fraction of the manager’s portfolio if
stock prices decline, compared to the share that was
allotted; that is, the share in the eventual portfolio
that the new investor’s cash contribution generates
generically does not correspond to the share he is being
assigned.
Notice that, in the field, shares are effectively deter-
mined by the expected payoff of the asset contributed,
namely, cash. We decided to apply the same rule. In our
6 If he contributed $5 in cash and the existing fund was worth $10
at the close, he is assigned a share of 1/3. If prices subsequently
increase 20%, the existing fund will be worth $12, but the cash
contribution still only allows the manager to buy $5 in stock, and
hence the contributed assets buy only 5/17 (< 1/3) of the shares of
the fund as intended by the manager.
experiment, however, investor subjects contribute assets
not only in the form of cash, but also in the form of
risky securities. Still, the rule can be applied: shares
(and consequently, fees) can be determined based on
the expected payoff of the contributed assets. Since
the experimenter controls and announces the state
probabilities, expected payoffs, and hence shares and
fees, are readily computed and immediately verifiable.
In principle, investor subjects could choose many
combinations of asset holdings to hand over to man-
agers. To simplify the theoretical analysis, we required
investor subjects to hand over fractions of their entire
endowment, so that different managers received portfo-
lios with the same composition; e.g., if a given manager
received 7% of a certain investor’s holdings of one
security, she received 7% of this investor’s holdings
of all other securities as well. In the theory, we shall
also assume that every investor starts with the same
initial portfolio, so that expected payoffs and values
are the same across investors. For reasons discussed
in §4, we did not implement this assumption literally
in the experiment; instead, we allocated securities in
ways that ensured that expected payoffs and values
were approximately equal, which was all we needed
for the theory to apply.
3. The Model
We now develop the theory, starting from the baseline
setting, and subsequently introducing amendments
that generate sharper (choice) predictions and that
simultaneously admit better experimental control.
3.1. Baseline Scenario
The baseline is a variation of an AD economy with I
investors. States are indexed by s (s = 11 0 0 0 1 S5, and
s denotes the chance that state s occurs. An AD
security, or a state security for s, pays $1 in state
s and $0 otherwise. Investor i (i = 11 0 0 0 1 I) has an
initial endowment of state-dependent wealth stream,
expressed as a collection of state securities with xi10s
units of security s. Let x0s =
∑
i x
i10
s be the aggregate
wealth in state s.
There are M , M > S, managers indexed by
m 4= 11 0 0 0 1M5, each of whom can offer investors units
of a single contract denoted m. This contract, gross
of management fees, is either an AD security or a
convex combination of AD securities. Thus, a man-
ager m’s contract is a vector m = 4m1 1 0 0 0 1 mS 5, (ms ≥ 0,∑
s 
m
s = 1).7 Managers can sell any non-negative num-
ber of units of their contract to different investors.
To deliver the promised payouts, managers trade in
a set of complete securities markets. Managers enter
the markets endowed with assets given to them by
investors. Markets are competitive and both borrowing
7 If the manager chooses to offer an AD security, ms = 1 in some state
s, and m
s′ = 0 in all other states, s′ 6= s.
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and short selling are allowed. Prices of securities are
denoted pds (s = 11 0 0 0 1 S; the superscript d indicates
that these prices are from the inter-manager market).8
Managers are paid a fixed fee, f (0 < f < 1), for each
unit of contract they sell, charged as a back-end load
fee. Let xim denote the number of contracts investor i
acquires from manager m (xim ≥ 0). As a result, investor
i owes a fee of ximf to manager m. To acquire x
i
m units
of manager m’s contract, investor i has to hand over the
necessary holdings of state securities so that manager m
can trade to positions that allow her to deliver the
contractually specified payoffs. This means that i must
hand over to m state securities with a total value of∑
s p
d
s x
i
m
m
s .
Investors are assumed to have a standard concave
utility over final wealth after fee payment. The wealth
net of fees of investor i in state s is equal to zis =∑
m x
i
m4
m
s − f 5. Investor i is assumed to be maximizing
expected utility with respect to his contract holdings.
Investor i’s objective function is therefore
Ui48x
i
m95=
S∑
s=1
sui
(∑
m
xim4
m
s − f 5
)
0
Investor i’s budget constraint is derived as the sum of
i’s constraints with respect to each manager:∑
s
pds
∑
m
xim
m
s =
∑
s
pds x
i10
s 0
The economy is thus comprised of the set of
investors I , their (concave) utilities over final wealth,
ui, and their initial endowments, xi10s , and the set of
managers M and their fees f .
An equilibrium for this economy is given by the
following:
(i) Managers offer contracts, m, m= 11 0 0 0 1M , such
that no contract outside the equilibrium set can make
at least one investor better off.
(ii) Investor holdings, xi, i = 11 0 0 0 1 I (xi =
4xi11 0 0 0 1 x
i
M 5), are such that expected utility, U
i, is maxi-
mized subject to the budget constraint.
(iii) Intermanager market prices, pds , s = 11 0 0 0 1 S, are
such that all markets clear.
This equilibrium notion follows the tradition estab-
lished in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Conditions (ii)
and (iii) above are standard. Condition (i) states that in
equilibrium, no investor can benefit from the addition of a
contract to the equilibrium set. This requirement relates
to subgame perfection. It presupposes that making
some investor better off is profitable for an entering
manager. This can only be the case if investors choose
8 In the experiment, investors are endowed with, and managers
trade in, assets that are not state securities. Because our markets are
complete, however, all trades and prices can always be reexpressed
in terms of state securities.
optimally along each subgame, immediately reacting to
the entry of a beneficial contract. Even with subgame
perfection, a deviation that improves the situation of
some investor may not be beneficial for a manager,
since she may lose other “clients” (investors). Hence
our requirement that no additional contract be beneficial.
With sufficiently many managers, there will almost
certainly be redundant contracts, in which case a devi-
ation by an existing manager can be interpreted as an
entry.9
If M > I , an equilibrium where managers coordinate
and offer investors’ optimal portfolios always exists.
Nontrivial equilibria where managers offer portfolios
different from each investor’s optimum exist if man-
agers offer a complete set of securities such that all
investors can achieve their optimum by acquiring a
conical combination of those securities. One such equi-
librium, requiring that M >S, is where each manager
offers an AD security.
Notice that any equilibrium with a complete set
of contracts is equivalent in state prices and investor
allocations to an equilibrium where only the S AD
securities are offered. If managers only offer AD secu-
rities, we can assume that there are S representative
managers indexed by s, the AD security they offer.
The investor problem becomes one where he directly
chooses his wealth in state s (gross of fees), xis . As a
result, the program for investor i in this setting is
max
xi
S∑
s=1
sui
(
xis − f
S∑
s′=1
xis′
)
s.t.
S∑
s=1
xisp
d
s =
S∑
s=1
xi10s p
d
s 0
Investors pay a fee, f , on the total of contracts
they acquire,
∑
s x
i
s . Hence, their wealth net of fees is
zis = xis − f
∑
s′ x
i
s′ . Normalizing market prices so that
they add up to one, the first-order condition (FOC) of
the investor program generates the following condition
for relative prices:
u′i4z
i
s5
u′i4z
i
t5
= 641 − Sf 5p
d
s + f 7/s
641 − Sf 5pdt + f 7/t
0
With complete markets, the right-hand side of the
above expression is equal for all i, which implies the
existence of a representative consumer with utility u,
such that
u′4z0s 5
u′4z0t 5
= 641 − Sf 5p
d
s + f 7/s
641 − Sf 5pdt + f 7/t
0 (1)
9 Consider a setting, as in our experiment, where there are three states
of the world and 32 managers. Three linearly independent contracts
suffice for investors to achieve their optimal portfolios. Suppose
only two linearly independent contracts are offered. It is very
likely that some manager can make a profit by offering a third
linearly independent contract instead of the redundant contract she
is currently offering.
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Clearly market prices are different than when portfo-
lio delegation is absent.10 However, the powerful rela-
tion that the state price–probability ratios are inversely
ranked to the wealth in the states continues to hold.
In line with previous experimental work, we call this
relation the “weak CAPM.” State price–probability
ratios are the ratios of state prices to the probability of
occurrence of the state. For general state probabilities,
the relation (1) implies that the weak CAPM holds
for fee-adjusted prices, p˜ds = 41 − Sf 5pds + f , but not
necessarily for the intermanager trading prices, pds .
When states are equally likely, the weak CAPM also
holds for intermanager trading prices, since
p˜ds /s
p˜dt /t
= p˜
d
s
p˜dt
= 41 − Sf 5p
d
s + f
41 − Sf 5pdt + f
1
and clearly, p˜ds > p˜
d
t if and only if p
d
s > p
d
t .
3.2. Introducing Limited Liability
Adding limited liability for fee payments, the investor
program with AD contracts becomes as follows:
max
xi
S∑
s=1
sui4x
i
s41 − f 55
s.t.
S∑
s=1
xisp
d
s =
S∑
s=1
xi10s p
d
s 0
Notice that investor i’s fee-adjusted wealth in state s is
now zis = xis41 − f 5. This is because a manager offering
state security s will only receive her fee payment in
state s. Hence, investor wealth in any given state s is
reduced by the fee payment made to state s managers
only.
As before, market completeness and the first-order
conditions of investors imply that there exists an aggre-
gate investor with utility u such that
u′4z0s 5
u′4z0t 5
= p
d
s /s
pdt /t
0
As before, state price–probability ratios are inversely
ranked to the wealth across states. In other words, the
weak CAPM continues to hold.11
With limited liability, managers will want to offer AD
securities. To see this, refer to Figure 1, and imagine
10 Without delegation and delegation fees, the condition analogous to
condition (1) would be
u′4x0s 5
u′4x0t 5
= ps/s
pt/t
0
11 See the supplemental online material for a numerical example
where investors hold quadratic utility and parameters emulate those
of our experimental design. The example is worked out both with
and without limited liability.
that an investor would like to acquire a portfolio which,
including fees, brings him to position a after the fee.
This can be accomplished by acquiring  units of the
contract of a manager who offers the AD security 1
(which pays $1 in state 1) and 1 −  units of security 2.
The position gross of fees is denoted a′. The total
fee that our investor pays equals f in state 1 and
41−5f in state 2. The AD securities expire worthless in
complementary states, and hence the investor does not
owe any fee for those states. Can a manager enter and
make the investor better off when offering a contract
which is a strict convex combination of AD securities,
like E in Figure 1? Our investor could now generate
a′ with  units of AD contract 1 and 1 −  units of
contract E. (Investors can only acquire positive fractions
of manager contracts, so our investor cannot obtain a′
by combining E with AD security 2.) Necessarily,  < ,
but because of this, the fee cost to our investor is strictly
higher in both states: it is f + 41 −5f = f (> f ) in
state 1 and 41−5f (> 41−5f ) in state 2. So, net of fees,
our investor receives strictly less in both states than
required for his desired allocation a. The investor will
not be enticed by the manager with contract E; he will
stay with the manager with contract 2. The argument
is not specific to two states.
Hence, when there are a sufficient number of man-
agers, we obtain an equilibrium where a complete set
of AD securities is offered to satisfy the demands of
all investors. There can be other equilibria where a
complete set of contracts different from AD securities is
offered. Such equilibria are not intuitive, though. More
importantly, not every complete set of securities sur-
vives the entry of even a single manager offering an AD
security. One can push this and allow for simultaneous
entry of multiple managers and refine our equilibrium
notion to require that no set of contracts outside those
offered in equilibrium makes at least one investor better off.
With this strong form of equilibrium, only equilibria
where managers offer a complete set of AD securities
survive. Other equilibria will be ruled out because a
set of AD contracts would make investors better off.
3.3. Share and Fee Determination Based on
Expected Payoffs
We now study the impact of assessing the management
fees as a fixed percentage  of the expected payoff rather
than the value of the contributed assets. At the same
time, shares in the fund will be determined by the
expected payoff of contributed assets as well.
First, we address whether this changes the desire
of investors to solely choose managers who intend to
trade to AD securities, and hence to whom they owe
the management fee in only one state. The answer is
no, and here is why. The investor allocates fractions
of his initial endowment to each of the managers, so
the fees he pays in each state will only be a fraction of
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Figure 1 The Optimal Allocation a Can Be Obtained, Gross of Fees, Through a Convex Linear Combination a′ of AD Securities 1 and 2
State 1
St
at
e 
2
1/5 2/3 1
AD 1
f
0
0
1/3
4/5
1
AD 2
Payoff of security E:
(1/5, 4/5)
Allocation obtained net of fees if a 
is acquired through managers offering 1 and E
( of AD security 1 and 1 –  of E,
where  = 7/12)
Desired allocation a, obtainable including fees as
 of 1 and 1 –  of 2, where  = 2/3
(1 – )f
Allocation demanded a  including fees
if acquired through managers offering 1 and 2
Notes. Dark dashed lines indicate fees charged. The gross-of-fee allocation a′ can also be obtained through a convex linear combination of offers 1 and E. After
fees (i.e., net of fees), the latter produces a strictly inferior allocation, because the fees required in each state (light dashed lines) are strictly larger. Investors prefer
combining offers 1 and 2.
the fraction of the expected value of his initial endow-
ment he allocates to the managers who invest for the
corresponding state. Imagine that an investor’s initial
endowment is expected to generate $10 in payoffs.
The investor allocates 1/3 of his wealth to managers
who intend to buy AD securities for each of three
possible states. If the fee rate is = 002, then he owes
managers $0.67 (= 10∗0033∗002) in each state. If instead
the investor decides to assign his entire wealth to a
manager who intends to buy to a portfolio that pays in
each state, he owes the manager $2 (= 10 ∗ 002) in all
states (provided the manager always generates enough
payoff). The latter is obviously larger, so the investor
should prefer to allocate his wealth over managers
who commit to trading to AD securities.
As to the impact on pricing, we envisage that
investor i contributes a share is of his entire portfolio to
the manager offering AD security s. Let Pi =
∑
s sx
i10
s
be the expected payoff of investor i’s initial endow-
ment, and let Wi =
∑
s p
d
s x
i10
s be the market value of
investor i’s initial endowment. Since all securities are
distributed equally to a given manager, it follows that
manager s receives a fraction of investor i’s expected
payoff equal to isPi and a fraction of the market value
of investor i’s endowment equal to isWi. The fee owed
to manager s is isPi. Investors face two constraints
in their choice of manager contracts: they distribute
all their resources, meaning that
∑
s 
i
s = 1, and their
desired amount, xis , must equal their share in the fund
for AD security s.
For the remainder we require that all investors have
equal expected payoff (Pi = P ) and equal market value
of their initial endowment (Wi = W ). We therefore
assume that all investors have the same initial endow-
ment of assets, xi10. This assumption implies both
Pi = P and Wi =W . Equal expected payoff implies that
the share of investor i in fund s is ˜is = is/4
∑I
j=1 
j
s5.
Thus, xis = ˜isx0s (the latter employs the argument that
the entire social supply of x0s will be demanded and
supplied in equilibrium). It then follows that the dollar
fee per unit of security s for investor i is
f is =
isP
xis
= 4
∑I
j=1 
j
s5P
x0s
= AsP
x0s
1
where As =
∑I
j=1 
j
s . Thus, the fee is now endogenous
(state dependent), though it remains the same for all
investors.
Investor i’s program in this setup is
max
xi
S∑
s=1
sui4x
i
s41 − fs55
s.t.
S∑
s=1
As
xis
x0s
= 11
where the latter constraint is derived from
∑S
s=1 
i
s = 1
and xis = 4isx0s 5/As . Like before, fee-adjusted wealth is
simply zis = xs41 − fs5, with the difference that now the
fee is state dependent. Managers, on the other hand,
face a budget constraint that ensures that they can
acquire the promised amounts x0s with the resources
provided by investors:
pds x
0
s =
I∑
i=1
isWi =WAs0
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Investors’ FOCs imply the existence of a representa-
tive investor with utility u. Combining the representa-
tive investor’s FOC and managers’ budget constraints,
we obtain the following result for relative prices:
u′4z0s 5
u′4z0t 5
= p
d
s /4s41 − fs55
pdt /4t41 − ft55
0 (2)
Equation (2) states that fee-adjusted prices, p˜ds = pds /
41 − fs5, satisfy the weak CAPM. Since fees are state
dependent, it does not immediately follow that the
weak CAPM will also hold for trading prices, pds .
We show in the supplemental online material, however,
that the weak CAPM follows through for trading prices
as well; that is, if state s has a larger fee-adjusted
wealth (z0s ) than state t (z
0
t ), the price of state s (p
d
s ) will
be smaller than the price of state t (pdt ).
4. Details of the Experimental Setup
The experiment consisted of a multiperiod main session
followed by a one-period end session. The purpose of
the end session was to eliminate the possible unrav-
eling of manager incentives. The entire experiment
including the end session lasted approximately two
months. Each week, one period of the main session
was conducted, for a total of six periods. The end
session lasted one period (one week).12 Subjects in the
experiment were divided into investors and managers.
During the entire experiment, managers were the same
32 subjects. Investors needed not be the same individu-
als each period, and their number changed slightly
from period to period, but equaled 70 on average.
As in the theory, investors were endowed with initial
holdings of securities, which they were required to
distribute among managers. Investors could not buy,
sell, or store assets directly, and we asked them to
assign all of their initial resources to one or more of
the managers, who would subsequently trade on their
behalf and collect the liquidating dividends. In what
follows, we outline the design of the main session
of the experiment. First we describe the assets and
their supply and dividends (the “economy”), and next
we describe the timeline and subjects’ payoffs in each
experimental period.
4.1. Assets and Dividends
Investors were endowed with units of two risky assets,
called A and B, and some cash. In addition to trad-
ing assets A and B, managers could trade a risk-free
12 The original design aimed for eight periods in the main session
followed by the end session. Here we report only six periods since an
accounting error in the seventh and eighth periods caused inaccurate
reporting in the information disclosure stage. As such, periods 7 and
8 effectively became periods in the end session, which absorbed
possible end-of-game effects in manager behavior.
Table 1 State-Dependent Liquidating Dividends (in U.S. Cents per Unit)
State
X Y Z
Asset A 5 80 0
Asset B 0 30 80
Bond 100 100 100
security called “Bond,” which was in zero net supply.
Assets A and B were risky because their end-of-period
liquidating dividends depended on the realization
of a random state of the world that could take three
values, X, Y , and Z. Security Bond paid the same
dividend of $1 in every state of the world. Because of
the presence of cash, Bond was a redundant security.
However, managers were allowed to short sell Bond if
they wished. Short sales of security Bond corresponded
to borrowing. Table 1 summarizes the dividends of the
three traded assets, expressed in cents (all accounting
in the experiment was done in U.S. currency). The three
payoff-relevant states, X, Y , and Z, were equally likely
and this was known to both managers and investors.
Unlike in the theory, investors were not originally
endowed with AD securities. This did not affect equi-
librium predictions since the markets created in the
experiment were complete (security payoffs across
states were linearly independent) and managers were
allowed to short sell securities. By forcing managers
to construct AD securities through short sales, we
know that if their portfolios were AD securities, it
was not by accident. Managers had to carefully con-
struct their portfolios to emulate different AD securities.
To emulate an AD security paying $1 in state X and 0
in the other states, they had to short sell both risky
securities. Similarly, to pay $1 in state Z and 0 in other
states, managers had to short sell security A. Finally, to
emulate an AD security that paid $1 only in state Y ,
managers had to go long in both risky securities, while
shorting Bond.13
In the tradition of CAPM experiments (Bossaerts and
Plott 2004), we split investors in two groups and gave
them different endowments. An investor of type A
held 100 units of asset A and $6 of cash, whereas an
investor of type B held 70 units of asset B and $9 of
cash. Nobody started out with bonds.
In the variant of our model where fees and shares
are determined using expected payoffs, as in the exper-
iment, we assumed that all investors started with the
same endowment of securities and cash. We did not
fully implement this assumption because it is bad
13 The exact portfolios to attain a payoff of $1 in state s and zero
in all other states, are, for s =X, −0081 units of A, −103 units of
B, and 1.04 bonds; for s = Y , 1.3 units of A, 0.081 units of B, and
−00065 bonds; and for s =Z, −0049 units of A, 1.22 units of B, and
0.024 bonds.
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experimental design: absent strong indications of dif-
ferences in preferences across subjects, heterogeneity
in initial allocations provides more opportunities for
exchange, and hence facilitates price formation. In the
theory, the assumption of equal initial allocations was
only made to ensure that expected payoffs and market
values of initial allocations were equal. By cleverly
assigning initial allocations, we ensured that investors’
expected payoffs (sum of total dividends per state
weighted by state probabilities) were the same to within
$0.50 ($34.3 and $34.7 for type A and type B, respec-
tively). It was more difficult to ensure that market
values were equal because we did not have ex ante
information about prices in the intermanager market.
However, by choosing allocations with almost equal
expected payoffs for all investors, we ensured that
market values would be similar if risk premia were
not too large.14
Endowing investors with securities instead of
cash, and making these endowments different across
investors, creates idiosyncratic risk beyond mere differ-
ences in risk aversion. This is an important element of
our model and, as mentioned above, provides more
opportunities for exchange, both in the experiment
as well as in practice. In our setup, idiosyncratic risk
provides strong incentives for investors to correctly
construct their portfolios of funds to move from a
position where wealth is highly variable across states to
a smoother, well-diversified position. Moreover, endow-
ing investors with securities is the only way for pricing
to be endogenous. If investors were endowed with
cash instead, then the assets would have to be supplied
exogenously, e.g., by a market maker. The incentives of
such exogenous supplier of assets would be different
from the incentives of other market participants, and
the analysis would then no longer be one of general
equilibrium, but one of partial equilibrium.
The market portfolio is the aggregate endowment
of assets A and B. In our setup, the total number of
investors as well as the fraction of investors of each
type varied slightly from one period to the next, so that
the composition of the (per capita) market portfolio
also varied. Table 8 (shown in §5.3) provides period-by-
period details on the distribution of investor types and
the corresponding market portfolio composition as well
14 Closer inspection of the pricing equations derived in the theory
reveals that they rely on being able to write
∑I
i=1 
i
sWi =K
∑I
i=1 
I
s
(where K is a constant). A sufficient condition is that Wi =W , which
is what we assumed (values of initial endowments are the same
across investors). An alternative approach that approximates the
result as the number of investors increases is to assume that initial
endowments and preferences are randomly and independently
distributed across investors. This would imply that E4isWi5 =
E4is5E4Wi5, and hence
∑I
i=1 
i
sWi ≈ W¯
∑I
i=1 
I
s , where W¯ is the average
wealth across investors. In our experiments it is very plausible that
preferences and initial endowments were independent, since the
latter were randomly assigned upon subject sign-up.
as the resulting aggregate wealth (dividend payments)
across states. As one can discern, the aggregate wealth
was always highest in state Y and lowest in state X.
4.2. Timeline and Payoff
One period of the main session spanned over one
calendar week and was roughly divided up into three
stages: the asset allocation stage, the trading stage,
and the information disclosure stage. Table 2 gives a
schematic overview of a single weekly period. The
effective time commitment of subjects was variable,
since investors could freely dedicate time to planning
their allocation strategies, whereas managers could
freely allocate time to planning their trading strategies.
However, by agreeing to participate, managers commit-
ted to logging in to the trading session, which lasted
30 minutes once per week, and investors committed
to submitting their choice of allocation to managers
within a fixed time window of 11 hours. We begin by
describing this asset allocation stage.
4.2.1. Asset Allocation Stage. Investors signed up
weekly. Once signed up, investors were granted access
to the allocation interface, which opened at 7 a.m.
on Tuesday and remained open until 6 p.m. on the
same day. Investors could log in to the interface at
any moment, for any duration of time, and possibly
repeatedly, during this window of time. During the
asset allocation stage, an investor could choose the
number of units of his risky asset (A or B, depending
on the investor’s type) to allocate to each manager.
If a manager was allocated a fraction of an investor’s
risky asset, the same fraction of the investor’s cash was
also allocated to that manager (this is in accordance
with the theoretical assumption that investors allocate
fractions of their entire portfolios to each manager).
Investors’ allocations to managers determined each
manager’s initial portfolio, each investor’s share in each
manager’s fund, and each manager’s fee. Managers
were informed of their own initial portfolio, but not
that of other managers, at the beginning of the trading
stage. An investor’s share in the manager’s fund was
determined by the expected dividend of his contribu-
tion to the total expected dividend of the manager’s
initial portfolio. Management fees were determined as
a fixed fraction (40%) of the expected dividend of the
contributed assets. The fee was back-end loaded, which
means that it came out of the liquidating dividend
of the manager’s final portfolio. If this dividend was
insufficient, investors did not owe the fee (investors
had limited liability, as assumed in the theory); instead,
we, the experimenters, paid out the managers.
A 40% management fee on assets under management
is not realistic, but it allowed us to compensate subjects
appropriately for the time and effort invested in the
experiment. A lower fee, especially a realistic 2%, would
have meant that investors, who were not investing their
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Table 2 Timeline for One Week-Long Period
Wednesday Friday Saturday Monday Tuesday
Investors and managers
informed of payoffs
Performance indices
published on website
Sign-up announcement for
investors
Performance indices published
in The California Tech
6 p.m. close of investor allocation
stage
(Only first week) sign up
for managers
Investors receive access to
allocation software
10 p.m. managers see allocations
and trading starts
10:30 p.m. trading ends
own money and did not need to engage in trade would
have earned disproportionately more than managers.
This problem would have been exacerbated in our
experiment because the number of investors with
respect to the number of managers was relatively
small. Our choice to have a large set of managers (32)
was based on evidence from previous asset pricing
experiments on the relation between the number of
market participants and convergence to competitive
equilibrium (see, e.g., Bossaerts and Plott 2004). Put
simply, one needs sufficiently many, relatively small,
market participants to maintain a competitive market.
We already discussed earlier why we decided to
pay managers their full fee even if dividends were
insufficient and investors’ limited liability was binding.
This bailout does not affect managers’ incentives to
obtain as many funds as possible from investors and, as
such, to supply contracts preferred by these investors
(AD securities). And it ensures that managers effectively
face no risk, since they receive their full fee regardless
of the realized state of the world. Thus, the bailout
clause allows us to have a set of investor subjects who
are risk averse and simultaneously a set of manager
subjects who are risk neutral, since they effectively face
no risk.
The average fee per manager per period equaled $30.
The dispersion of fees among managers varied across
periods, and was most extreme in period 5, when a
single manager collected over $200 in fees. As we shall
see later, this is because of changes in concentration of
allocation of funds to managers in response to the type
of portfolios they historically had invested in and their
performance records in the prior round.
4.2.2. Trading Stage. Managers participated in a
30-minute trading session once per week (Tuesday at
10 p.m.). During the trading stage, managers could
trade through a Web-based, electronic, anonymous,
continuous open-book limit-order system called jMar-
kets.15 A snapshot of the trading screen is provided in
the electronic companion to this article.
15 This open-source trading platform was developed at Caltech
and is freely available under the GNU license. See http://jmarkets
.ssel.caltech.edu/. The trading interface is simple and intuitive.
It avoids jargon such as “book,” “bid,” “ask,” etc. The entire trading
process is point-and-click; that is, subjects do not enter numbers
(quantities, prices), but instead they merely point and click to submit
orders, to trade, or to cancel orders.
Managers’ initial portfolio of risky assets and cash
was given by investors’ allocation during the asset
allocation stage. All managers had zero initial holdings
of security Bond (i.e., Bond was in zero net supply).
Managers could buy and sell the two risky assets and
Bond in exchange for cash. Short sales of all three
tradable assets were allowed. To avoid bankruptcy
(and in accordance with classical general equilibrium
theory), our trading software constantly checked sub-
jects’ budget constraints. In particular, a bankruptcy
rule was used to prevent managers from committing
to trades (submitting limit orders) that would imply
negative cash holdings at the end of the period.16
The final portfolio of a manager generated a liqui-
dating dividend according to the random realization
of a state variable that became known only after the
conclusion of trading. The dividend, with the man-
agement fee subtracted from it, was distributed to the
investors according to their shares in the fund. If this
residual dividend was negative, the distribution to the
investors was equal to $0, which means that investors
had limited liability with respect to management fees.
The average payoff to investors was $26 ($3.50 when
the realization of the state variable was X, $42 when it
was Y , and $23.50 when it was Z).
4.2.3. Information Disclosure Stage. Each week,
on Monday morning, a series of performance indicators
were published on the experimental webpage as well
as the weekly university newspaper. To preserve the
privacy of participants in the experiment, all managers
were assigned pseudonyms used for all announcements.
We reported four performance indicators for all
managers as well as for an index called the Dow-tech
16 Whenever a manager attempted to submit an order, her cash
holdings after dividends were computed for all states, given current
asset holdings and outstanding orders that were likely to trade
(an order was considered likely to trade if its price was within 20%
of the last transaction price), including the order she was submitting.
If these hypothetical cash holdings turned out to be negative for
some state, the order was automatically canceled, and the trader
was informed that her order did not go through because of risk of
bankruptcy. However, in trading sessions when prices changed a lot,
it was possible that orders that originally passed the bankruptcy
check (because they were not considered likely to trade) eventually
were executed and led to negative value of final holdings. Thus,
despite the best attempts to avoid bankruptcy, rates of return at
times were below −100%.
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index, composed of one unit of asset A, one unit of
asset B, and $1 cash. The following performance indi-
cators were used: Portfolio Return, Market Share (called
“Volume” in the published reports), Residual, and Risky
Share. Portfolio Return is the (prefee) final value (based
on liquidating dividends) of a manager’s portfolio as a
percentage of the market value of the initial portfolio.
Market value was determined using average transac-
tion prices in the period. Market Share is the ratio of
the expected liquidating value of manager j’s initial
portfolio and the expected liquidating value of the
portfolio comprised of all assets and cash available to
all investors. Expected liquidating value is determined
using the expected value of asset dividends. The Resid-
ual is the liquidating value of a manager’s portfolio
(based on paid dividends) minus the fees paid to the
manager. The Risky Share provides an indication of the
amount of risk the portfolio manager was taking. It is
given by the market value of risky securities (A and B)
as a fraction of the market value of the manager’s entire
portfolio.17 The experimental webpage dedicated to
weekly performance contained a succinct but complete
explanation of the meaning of each of the indicators.
This was always available for investors to consult.18
Notice that we did not have a stage where managers
announced the portfolios they planned to supply to
investors. Allowing for such announcements would
have been problematic, since managers’ ability to stick
to their promises depended on trading prices, in turn
determined by demand and supply forces. Hence, the
possibility that all managers simultaneously offered
feasible portfolios to investors constituted a complex
coordination problem that very likely would have
led managers to default on their promises in early
periods of the experiment. Instead, we counted on
managers building a reputation for offering certain
types of contracts that investors could learn via the
announced indicators for previous periods. We checked
this reputation-building assumption ex post with regres-
sions of managers’ final holdings of each security in
period t on the final holdings in period t− 1. (Holdings
17 The electronic companion contains further details, including the
list of pseudonyms, experimental instructions, and computational
details for the variables used in the reports, as well as in our results
section. The end session is also described in detail in that document.
The end session, with changed incentives for managers, was included
to prevent managers from disregarding performance in the final
period and, in this way, unravel their incentives as well as investors’
trust all the way back to the initial period. Ex post, the terminal
period was of little importance since periods 7 and 8 were excluded
from our data. Period 6 could thus safely be used with no concerns
regarding possible last-period effects.
18 Anecdotal evidence suggests investor subjects followed and used
the weekly reports. The experimental email account received emails
from investor subjects asking when information would be disclosed,
requesting the indicators in formats useful for data processing, or
requesting more detailed indicators.
are normalized using the value of the initial endow-
ment, which could vary a lot from one period to the
next.) The effect of holdings in t− 1 is significant for all
three securities (p < 00001). We did not announce exact
portfolio composition for each manager in past periods,
since this would have led subjects to learn the market
portfolio in the experiment, up to the small changes
in the market portfolio from one period to the other.
Subjects’ knowledge of the market portfolio would
have weakened our results since such information
can be used to compute theoretical equilibrium price
rankings.
5. Results
The main implication of our theory when investors
have limited liability is the coexistence of managers
who offer extreme portfolios, emulating AD securities,
with investors that ultimately hold well-diversified port-
folios. We thus first present results regarding investor
preferences for managers who offer portfolios that
mimic AD securities. Next, we show that investors hold
well-diversified portfolios throughout the experiment,
whereas manager portfolios become less diversified
(more AD-like) as the experiment progresses. Finally,
we turn to results regarding prices and the ranking of
state price–probability ratios (weak CAPM).
Before we turn to the relevant results, we present
some descriptive statistics, namely, asset turnover and
state realizations. Table 3 suggests that asset turnover
was high: often more than 50% of the outstanding
securities changed hands in the intermanager market.
Across the six periods, each state was realized at least
once, with the worst state (state X, with the lowest
aggregate wealth) being drawn in periods 3 and 6.
5.1. Investors’ Choice of Managers
According to our theory, in equilibrium investors allo-
cate funds across managers who offer portfolios that
mimic AD securities. We shall determine to what extent
this preference is revealed in investor choices by study-
ing manager market shares and correlating those with
a variable that measures how far manager portfolios
were from AD securities.
Table 3 Asset Turnover and State Realization (per Period)
Period
1 2 3 4 5 6
Turnovera
Asset A 0037 0053 0045 0047 0048 0057
Asset B 0040 0035 0053 0056 0069 0078
State outcome Z Y X Y Y X
aAsset turnover is calculated by dividing the trading volume by the total
number of units outstanding.
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Table 4 Market Concentration Index (Gini Index) and Market Share of
the Largest Manager
Period Gini index Largest manager market share
1 001334 000524
2 005039 001236
3 003434 001032
4 004905 001995
5 004978 002034
6 005491 001342
First, consider individual manager market shares,
i.e., the percentage of the expected liquidating value of
all assets that is received by a given manager. In the
first round, investors allocated their initial endowment
to managers very much randomly, so that each man-
ager received an approximately equal share (1/32, or
about 3%). This reflects absence of knowledge of the
investment plans of the managers. Only in period 2
could investors gauge the intentions of managers,
by observing past performance, as reported on the
experiment website and in the university newspaper.
Already in period 2, investors preferentially allocated
their wealth to a few managers. This pattern continued
over time, and led to relatively high concentration
of investor wealth among a few portfolio managers.
Indeed, Table 4 confirms that both the market share of
the largest manager in terms of value of assets under
management and the Gini index of concentration19
increased in period 2 and remained high (double-digit
market share of the largest managers and Gini indices
around 0.50) for the remainder of the experiment.
Of course, the main issue is whether these preference
patterns reflect the theoretical prediction that investors
prefer to go with managers who invest in portfolios
with payoffs that mimic those of AD securities, that is,
were managers who attracted a disproportionate share
of the flow of funds also the ones that invested in
portfolios with AD-like payoffs? To verify this, we ran
a number of regressions with manager market share
as dependent variable, and as explanatory variables
we used (i) a measure of distance of final manager
portfolio holdings from an AD security in the prior
period and (ii) prior-period residual payoff after man-
agerial fees (the Residual indicator reported to subjects).
The first explanatory variable, called LagDistanceAD,
was measured as follows. Let m denote the state
19 The Gini index measures the difference between the area under
the cumulative distribution function of a uniform distribution of
(manager) wealth and the actual, empirical distribution. A large
difference indicates high concentration. In our case it was computed
as follows. First, record the expected value of a manager’s initial
endowment vm. Next rank managers so that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vM . Then,
for each m, let wm =mvm, and compute the ratio r =
∑
mwm/
∑
m v
m.
Finally, transform r as follows to get the Gini index: G= 4I+1−2∗r5/I .
A list of market shares of individual managers across all periods is
available on the experiment website (see Footnote 15 for the link).
Table 5 Manager Market Share Regressed on Lagged Distance of
Offered Portfolio from AD Security (Top) and on This Lagged
Distance Plus Lagged Residual Divided by 100 (Bottom)
Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard error t p value
Intercept 00048 00006 7055 <00001
LagDistanceAD −00020 00004 −5014 <00001
Intercept 00023 00003 7005 <00001
LagDistanceAD −00009 00003 −3023 00003
LagResidual 00023 00002 10052 <00001
where manager m’s final portfolio paid the highest
dividend, and let ¯m denote the collection of remaining
states. LagDistanceAD was computed as the ratio of
the state-price-weighted average total dividend in all
states in ¯m over the total dividend times the state
price in state m. This measure is minimal (0) when the
manager perfectly mimics the payoff on AD security m.
It increases as managers buy portfolios that pay more
total dividend in states in ¯m.20 We will refer to m as
manager m’s type.
Many variations of this base regression were tried.
In these variations we either slightly varied the defi-
nition of the distance of a manager’s final portfolio
payoff pattern from the payoff on an AD security
or we added potentially confounding factors such as
payoff variance of the manager’s final portfolio in the
previous period, expected payoff of the manager’s final
portfolio, and period dummies. Although addition
of confounding factors at times had an effect on the
significance of the effects of the two main explanatory
variables ((i) and (ii) above), the signs remained robust.
Table 5 displays the regression results. Consistent
with the theory, the distance of a manager’s portfolio
from mimicking an AD security (LagDistanceAD) has
a highly significant (p < 00001 univariate and p =
00003 multivariate) negative effect on a manager’s
market share, suggesting that investors preferred to
allocate their wealth across managers who offered
portfolios that looked more like AD securities, and
hence exploited investors’ limited liability for the
manager fee. The regression results are based on 31
(number of managers minus 1) times 5 (number of
periods minus 1), i.e., 155, observations.
Table 5 also shows that the realized return minus
the fee in the previous period (LagResidual) has a
20 With large trading volumes, the automated bankruptcy check used
in the experiment did not always prevent managers from holding
portfolios with negative payoffs in some states (see Footnote 16).
Whenever this happened, we reset the negative payoff to zero for the
computation of the indicator LagDistanceAD and its unlagged variant,
DistanceAD. This was done to prevent the indicator from being
biased toward zero (small DistanceAD). For example, a manager that
yields the largest payoff in state Z, closely followed by the payoff in
state Y , should have a large DistanceAD. But if her payoff in state X
is negative, the numerator in the formula of DistanceAD will be close
to zero, leading to an artificially low DistanceAD.
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significantly positive effect (p < 00001) on market share.
The lagged residual is an indicator that combines
a manager’s realized return in the previous period,
given the state of the world, with the ability of this
manager to charge relatively low fees by concentrating
on one state’s payoffs only. There are a number of
interpretations of this result.
First, as a proxy for realized returns, the lagged resid-
ual could be a way for investors to resolve indifference
between two managers who offered portfolios with the
same distance from an AD security. There is no a priori
reason to believe in differential managerial skills in our
experimental setting, but investors may have taken the
lagged residual as an indicator that there was, and may
have allocated funds accordingly. This phenomenon
would be consistent with the theory of (and evidence
of real-world) fund flows in Berk and Green (2004).
Second, keeping fixed the distance from AD secu-
rities, the lagged residual together with information
on the realized state was the best index that investors
had about what state of the world a given manager
was focusing on. Investors could subsequently react
by allocating more funds to those managers focusing
on the wealthier states so that they (investors) could
successfully mimic the market portfolio.
Third, although less likely, absent transparent infor-
mation about the precise composition of a manager’s
portfolio (we only reported the weight on risky secu-
rities), the lagged residual could be another, albeit
noisy, indicator of how far a manager’s portfolio was
from mimicking an AD security. Indeed, the correlation
between our measure of distance (LagDistanceAD) and
the lagged residual is a significant −0023 (p= 00003).
In part this correlation arises because managers with a
small distance from AD securities have low fees and,
hence, higher residuals. However, in our experiment,
this correlation is also driven by the realization of the
richest state (state Y ) in three out of five lagged periods,
leading to a strong positive correlation between being
an AD security and obtaining a large return. As such,
LagResidual provided information about LagDistanceAD.
One may wonder whether lagged distance from
AD securities affected market share only via its cor-
relation with realized returns whenever state Y was
realized: this state was so much wealthier than other
states that even managers offering the market portfolio
would appear to have a small distance from AD secu-
rities. With return-chasing investors, such managers
would also receive a large flow of funds because of
the large returns they generated when state Y was
realized. We consider an important variant of our main
regressions to address this concern.
We add indicators (dummy variables) for m =
X1Y 1Z, denoting the state where the final manager port-
folio paid the highest dividend, to the above-considered
regressions and report this in Table 6. LagDistanceAD
Table 6 Manager Market Share Regressed on Lagged Distance of
Offered Portfolio from AD Security and Lagged Residual
Divided by 100, Controlling for Manager Type (State Where
Her Final Portfolio Generated the Highest Dividend)
Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard error t p value
Intercept 00025 00004 6015 <00001
LagDistanceAD −00009 00003 −3016 00003
LagResidual 00023 00002 10069 <00001
DY −000025 00003 −0094 00353
DZ −000003 00006 −0004 00966
Note. The dummy for type X is omitted.
has a significant negative effect on market share also
after controlling for m (this is so also when DY or DZ ,
instead of DX , are omitted). Thus, even after taking
into account a manager’s “type” (m), lagged distance
from AD securities has a negative effect on market
share.
Notice that all managers were of some type, regard-
less of their DistanceAD indicator. A manager of type
X held a portfolio that yielded the highest payoff in
state X (m =X). If her payoff in other states was very
low or zero, she additionally had a low DistanceAD
indicator, whereas if her payoff in other states was
substantial, she had a high DistanceAD. Since managers
often received very balanced allocations, in 90% of
the cases they started out the trading stage being of
type Y , like the market portfolio. Becoming a type X
manager required them to short sell asset B. To further
become an AD security for state X, they also had to
short sell asset A. Although being of a given type is
not necessarily equal to holding a portfolio mimicking
the AD security of the corresponding state, the fact
that managers divided up into different type groups,
as opposed to all keeping well-diversified portfolios,
gives an indication of movement toward the focal
equilibrium with AD securities.
To further clarify the above point, recall that in
theory investors can achieve diversified portfolios
even if all managers offer funds that are close to the
market portfolio. However, in that case, they pay higher
fees than if managers split up in types corresponding
to states of the world. Fee payments are minimal if
managers become AD securities for each state of the
world. In the equilibrium where managers offer AD
securities, the market share of funds offering each
AD security perfectly matches the market portfolio;
that is, managers offering the state X AD security have
a market share equal to the ratio of state X wealth
over the sum of wealth in all states, and analogously
for states Y and Z. The closer our data are to such an
equilibrium, the closer the market share of each type
should be to the wealth shares of the market portfolio.
This is why we now ask whether managers split into
types and, if yes, what the market share was for each
type group.
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Table 7 Aggregate Market Share of Managers with Highest Dividend
Paid in Different States of the World
Manager type—m
Period X Y Z
1 0 7705 2205
2 0 6704 3206
3 1303 82066 4004
4 4079 69091 2503
5 4099 63098 31003
6 14094 54028 30078
The market portfolio changed very slightly from
period to period, and on average had wealth split up
in 3.06% for state X, 60.46% for state Y , and 36.48% for
state Z. Table 7 shows the market shares of managers of
each type in each period. The share of type Y managers
decreases almost steadily, which is consistent with a
situation where managers start out offering funds that
are close to the market portfolio (the market portfolio
is of type Y ), but move to more polarized funds in
later periods. In the final period, market shares closely
resemble the wealth shares of the market portfolio, with
an imbalance giving too large a share to type X and
too small shares to types Y and Z. Such an imbalance
fits with the choices of managers within each type
group, to which we turn next.
We ask whether within each type group investors
chose those managers whose portfolios most resembled
AD securities. The answer given by the regression in
Table 6 was yes, but a closer look reveals that it is
mainly driven by competition between managers of
type Y . The correlation between market share and
distance from AD securities is strongest for type Y
managers, and, in general, the distance from AD securi-
ties is larger for type X managers. The former is mainly
explained because there are more type Y managers
to start with, who persist in being of that type, thus
accumulating a history that allows investors to choose
those generating lower fees.21 The latter phenomenon
is driven by the difficulty of creating a state X AD
security, since it requires short sales of both risky
assets. This in turn contributes to the observed fact
that managers that are of type X in one period are
not of type X in every period, further leading to little
21 Managers 37, 16, and, especially, 32, carry out the strongest
competition. They are persistently of type Y and have very low
DistanceAD. (Manager 32 always has either the lowest or the second
lowest distance.) Jointly they hold a market share of approximately 9%
in period 2, which steadily increases to 36% in period 6. Manager 12
attains the highest market share of the experiment in period 5, but
he is an outlier capturing investors’ chasing of returns (possibly
wrongly interpreted as quality): he changed types every period,
by chance matching the realized state in the first four periods of
the experiment. In fact, when he failed to match the realized state
in period 5, his market share abruptly decreased in the following
period.
selection by investors of AD-like managers. The dispro-
portionate market share of type X in the last period is
a direct consequence of the observation that managers
of types Y and Z are more polarized than those of
type X.22 In fact, in periods 4 and 5, when the share of
X is lower, but still above the wealth share of state X,
state prices are not correctly ranked. We return to this
result in the pricing section below.
5.2. Investor and Manager Holdings
In the theory section we showed that investors in
our model will hold equal ratios of marginal utilities
across states. (These ratios equal relative prices, and
prices are equal for all investors.) This implies that
all investors will hold similar distributions of wealth
across states. Consequently, investor final holdings
are predicted to be well diversified—approximately
proportional to the wealth distribution of the market
portfolio.23 One of the main points illustrated by our
model is that because investors can hold diversified
portfolios of contracts offered by managers, they can
hold well-diversified portfolios, whereas managers do
not (will not). With limited liability of investors, we
actually expect managers to completely specialize and
hold AD securities. Figure 2 illustrates the extent to
which this important result is verified in the experiment.
It displays the histogram of the ratio of wealth in
state Y to the total wealth across all states for both
investors and managers, given investors’ shares in
the managers’ funds and given these funds’ postfee
payoffs in every state. For both groups of subjects, the
wealth in every state takes into account limited liability
and truncates at zero in states where postfee payoff
would have been negative.
As is clear from Figure 2, not all investors hold
the market portfolio, but the histogram of relative
final wealth is unimodal, centered around the (postfee)
market portfolio. This replicates the findings in past
asset pricing experiments where investors trade assets
directly (e.g., Bossaerts and Plott 2004, Bossaerts et al.
2007). The coexistence of CAPM prices and a unimodal
distribution of investor holdings centered at the market
portfolio is theoretically founded by a variant of the
CAPM that relaxes the assumption of quadratic utility,
allowing for individual deviations that wash out in
aggregate (CAPM + , Bossaerts et al. 2007). Figure 2
also shows, importantly, that this unimodal distribution
of investor final wealth is maintained to a large extent
22 The median DistanceAD across managers and periods was 1.23
for type X, whereas it was 0.83 for type Y , and 0.77 for type Z.
The managers with the lowest DistanceAD across periods were of
type Y , with a minimum median across periods (for subject 32)
of 0.004.
23 With the additional assumption of quadratic utility over final
wealth, the relation becomes exact. This is the CAPM property; see
the discussion in the supplemental online material.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
31
.21
5.7
0.2
31
] o
n 2
7 A
ug
us
t 2
01
5, 
at 
08
:44
 . F
or
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Asparouhova et al.: Competition in Portfolio Management
Management Science 61(8), pp. 1868–1888, © 2015 INFORMS 1883
Figure 2 Histogram of Final Holdings of Wealth in State Y as a Proportion of the Sum of Wealth in All States (After Fee), for Investors (Left Column) and
for Managers (Right Column)
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Figure 2 (Continued)
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Note. Left and right vertical lines indicate market portfolio weight before and after fees, respectively.
across all periods of the experiment. A significant
deviation from a unimodal distribution centered at
the market portfolio is observed only in period 5,
coinciding with the observed violation of the weak
CAPM in price predictions (this is in agreement with
the theory of CAPM +  mentioned before).
On the other hand, the distribution of final relative
postfee wealth for managers changes over the course of
the experiment. Already in the second period a mode
at 1 emerges. This means some managers quickly start
offering contracts that mimic state Y AD securities. As
periods pass, the histogram becomes more dispersed,
closer to bimodal (second mode at 0). This is a very
sharp illustration of the intuition lying at the base of
our theory: investors achieve their portfolio goals by
mixing different managers, whom they choose based
on their ability to handle costs (fees). In our setup,
managers’ correct reply to investors’ objectives is to
become polarized (mimic AD securities), which they
do, while prices still satisfy the weak CAPM.
At the same time as managers become more polar-
ized, investors reduce the number of managers they
include in their portfolios. The median investor holds
18.5 managers in the first period—basically, investors
randomly allocate their assets—8 in the third period,
and 6 in the last period. Our theory indicates that
three managers would suffice to obtain any desired
portfolio. There are several reasons to not expect this
number to arise in our experimental implementation,
not least of all that managers—unlike in the theory—do
not announce the contracts they will offer, but rather
investors deduce the contract a manager will offer from
the manager’s past performance.
5.3. Pricing
During the entire experiment, prices of risky securities
A and B were close to, and with few exceptions, below,
expected payoffs. (See the supplemental online material
for a plot of transaction prices.) The fact that prices were
generally below expectations suggests risk aversion.
With risk aversion, the weak CAPM predicts that when
prices of traded securities are converted to prices of AD
securities, their ranking (adjusted for state probabilities)
should be inverse to aggregate wealth across states.
In our setting, state price–probability ratios should
be highest when aggregate wealth is lowest, and lowest
when aggregate wealth is highest. Table 8 lists aggre-
gate wealth per state and period. Aggregate wealth is
always lowest in state X and always highest in state Y .
Aggregate wealth is computed from the dividends on
the outstanding assets (A, B, and Bond) added to the
total cash outstanding.
Figure 3 provides evidence for the relation between
state price–probability ratios and aggregate wealth.
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Table 8 Number of Participants by Type and Corresponding per Capita
Market Portfolio and Aggregate Wealth (Dividend) per State
(in Dollars)
Number of Per capita Aggregate wealth
participants market portfolio per state
Period Type A Type B A B Cash ($) X Y Z
1 30 34 4609 3702 7059 150 31114 1,904
2 28 38 4204 4003 7073 140 31038 2,128
3 37 34 5201 3305 7044 185 31038 2,128
4 37 35 5104 34 7046 185 31695 1,960
5 34 33 5007 3405 7048 170 31413 1,848
6 35 35 50 35 7050 175 31535 1,960
Plotted are the time series of state prices for the three
states, implied from trade prices. (Since all states are
equally likely, it is unnecessary to adjust state prices
for state probabilities.) Although the evidence looks
mixed at first, late in periods 2, 3, and 6, and during
the first half of period 5, state price–probability ratios
are ranked exactly as predicted by the weak CAPM:
the price for state X is highest, and that for state Y is
lowest.
Although not immediate from Figure 3, there is a
statistically significant tendency for state-price proba-
bilities to revert back to the right ranking (according to
the weak CAPM) when the ranking is incorrect. This is
determined as follows. Following Bossaerts and Plott
(2004), we construct a statistic, called  , that measures
the frequency with which state price–probability ratios
move in the right direction to restore ranking according
to the weak CAPM when ranking is incorrect. Specifi-
cally,  is the average across transactions of a variable
that assigns a value of 1 to a change in state prices
in the direction of the weak CAPM, and 0 otherwise.
The supplemental online material lists the changes
of state-price probabilities that are in line with the
weak CAPM. To avoid bias, we eliminate observations
where prices do not change (these would otherwise
automatically be assigned a value of 1).
To determine correct rejection levels for  at the
5% and 1% significance levels in each trading period
under the assumption that state price–probability ratios
change randomly, we bootstrapped the original time
series of transaction prices (period by period for assets
A, B, and Bond) after subtracting price drifts (so price
series become martingales), inverted the resulting
bootstrapped prices for state price–probability ratios,
and constructed 200 series of levels and subsequent
changes of state price–probability ratios with the same
length as the original (period) series. For each of these
200 series, we computed the  statistics and then
determined the critical level of  so that 5% (1%) of the
outcomes were above this level, thus obtaining cutoff
levels at p = 0005 (and p = 0001 respectively) for each of
the six trading periods.
Table 9 Tests of Whether Transaction Prices Follow a Martingale (H0)
Against Drift Toward Satisfying the Weak CAPM (H1)
Critical values (%)
Period  5 1
1 0073 0052 0062
2 0069 0038 0049
3 0083 0060 0070
4 0068 0052 0066
5 0072 0098 0098
6 0068 0029 0030
Table 9 displays the results. Shown are  statistics
for all periods, and corresponding critical values at the
5% and 1% levels. The null of no drift is rejected at
the 1% level in all but one (the fifth) period, where
 does not even reach the 5% cutoff level. Overall,
Table 9 provides evidence that is difficult to discern
from Figure 3, namely, that prices tend to change in
the direction of weak CAPM in the instances where
they do not conform to this theory.
In periods 1, 4, and 5 we observe state prices that
often deviate from the weak CAPM prediction. The
deviation observed in period 1 can be attributed to
subjects’ need to learn the experimental situation, but
in periods 4 and 5 it cannot be attributed to this cause—
especially after observing perfect state price rankings in
periods 2 and 3. In periods 4 and 5, type X managers
have a lower market share than in periods 3 and 6. The
market share is larger than in period 2, but in period 2
all types of managers were less polarized than in later
periods (larger DistanceAD). With a lower demand for
state X wealth (lower than in other periods, and lower
than in equilibrium), the price of this state is too low,
so much so that it leads to an incorrect ranking of state
prices.24
The lower market share of type X managers in
periods 4 and 5 may be a simple miscoordination
among managers in the offering of state securities.
However, it is surprising that with the disproportionate
increase in the price of security B, no manager chose
to convert to a type X manager via short-sales of this
security. It is more likely that the market share of
type X was affected by market concentration, which
was indeed highest in these periods. The successful
managers, who obtained most of the market share, were
not committed to supply diversified portfolios, but to
supply AD-like securities. Since investors allocate too
many funds to these managers, the idiosyncrasies of
these large funds have substantial effects on prices.
24 Indirectly, with fewer (or poorer) managers who are committed to
be of type X, the volume of (short) sales of security B is reduced, thus
increasing its price. This can be seen in the plot of the evolution of
transaction prices in the supplemental online material. Overpricing
of security B in turn leads to an underpricing of state X, whereas the
other states need not be misranked with respect to each other.
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Figure 3 Time Series of State Prices
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Notes. State prices for state X are indicated with arrows pointing up, those for Y are indicated with arrows pointing down, and those for Z are indicated with
arrows pointing sideways. State prices are implied from transaction prices after each trade, based on the most recent transaction for each security.
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Table 4 shows that the Gini index of concentration
could be as high as 0.55, and the market share of the
largest manager as high as 20%. Moreover, we know
that the largest fund in period 4 was of type Y , not X,
and the largest fund in period 5 was of type Z, not X.
For the CAPM pricing to obtain robustly, it is known
that individual idiosyncrasies need to average out, and
this can only occur if there are a sufficient number of
participants, all of whom only hold a small fraction of
wealth (Bossaerts et al. 2007).
Consistent with the hypothesis that concentration
has a detrimental effect on pricing, we discovered
that the correlation between concentration measures
and the  statistic is negative, albeit only marginally
significant. The correlation across periods with the
Gini concentration index is −0051 (standard error, 0.30);
that with the market share of the largest manager
is −0042 (standard error, 0.40). When computing 
based on all observations, including those where prices
do not change, these correlations become significant:
−0054 (standard error, 0.26) and −0058 (standard error,
0.23), respectively. As such, some of the poor pricing
should be attributed to market concentration, which
itself is the consequence of investors’ preferences for
managers who (i) acquire undiversified, AD security-
like portfolios and (ii) had high returns in the prior
period.25
We focus on the weak CAPM, but one may be inter-
ested to know whether also the strong CAPM obtains.
The CAPM requires the assumption that investors
have quadratic utility (or that a quadratic function is a
good approximation of the true utility; see Bossaerts
et al. 2007). In our setting where shares and fees
are computed using expected payoffs, even with the
assumption of quadratic utility, prices gross of fees sat-
isfy the CAPM only approximately. However, as shown
in the supplemental online material, numerical analyses
suggest that the difference between our equilibrium
prices and CAPM prices is minor. We could therefore
test one of the main predictions of the CAPM, namely,
that the market portfolio should be mean-variance
optimal.
An effective way to gauge the distance of the market
portfolio from optimality in mean-variance space is to
compute the difference between the Sharpe ratio of
the market portfolio and that of the maximal (mean-
variance optimal) portfolio (see Bossaerts and Plott
2004 for an early application of this metric in the
25 Some direct evidence that large managers influence prices in an
adverse way is found by looking at trade in the last 10 minutes
of periods 4 and 5. In period 4, the two largest managers, jointly
holding approximately 35% market share, bought asset B (approx-
imately 400 units), with only one large manager on the sell side
(approximately 8% market share). In period 5 the largest manager,
holding about 21% market share, again bought asset B (450 units),
with no large managers selling.
context of price data from experimental markets). One
can recompute this Sharpe ratio difference after each
transaction and take the average across all transactions
within a period.
If we then compare the average Sharpe ratio differ-
ence with  (which measures the extent to which prices
move in the direction of weak CAPM), we observe a
correlation of 0.34 (standard error, 0.51). When com-
puting  based on all observations, including those
where prices do not change, this correlation becomes
significant: 0.55 (standard error, 0.25). This illustrates
that our conclusions about pricing in the delegated
portfolio management experiment would have been
qualitatively the same if we had instead used the strong
version of the CAPM (which requires us to assume
quadratic utility).
6. Conclusion
In a break with tradition in the analysis of delegated
portfolio management, we here proposed a theory
where investors can choose to distribute wealth over
many managers, and where managers compete in terms
of the composition of portfolios offered to investors.
To narrow our predictions, we assumed that investors
have limited liability for manager fees. Fees are charged
on initial funds under management, but paid out of
final portfolio value. We find that manager incentives
are aligned with those of investors. In equilibrium,
managers offer portfolios that mimic AD securities,
and investors combine holdings in multiple funds to
generate “homemade” diversification. Prices in the
intermanager market continue to reflect demand for
diversification, as if investors had been able to invest
directly. Specifically, the weak CAPM obtains, which
predicts state price–probability ratios that are ranked
inversely with aggregate wealth.
We designed and ran a large-scale experiment involv-
ing approximately 100 subjects over multiple weeks
and studied manager portfolio choices, investor fund
allocation decisions, and pricing in the intermanager
market. The three main predictions of the theory were
confirmed, namely, (i) investors preferred managers
that offered portfolios that came closer to mimicking
the payoff on AD securities, (ii) investors engaged in
“homemade” diversification, and (iii) prices tended to
levels that were in accordance with the weak CAPM
(and in fact, even in accordance with the traditional,
strong version of the CAPM).
We did observe an effect of return realization in
the immediate past on subsequent fund flows, as in
historical data from the field (Berk and Green 2004).
The resulting concentration of funds led to a deteriora-
tion of price quality; all else equal, prices reflected the
weak CAPM to a lesser extent than when funds were
distributed more evenly across managers.
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Our experiment should be considered a proof of
concept: it shows that it is possible to run meaningful
controlled experiments on delegated portfolio manage-
ment in the laboratory. Our experiment was limited
in many respects. Foremost, the same 32 managers
participated in all the investment rounds, and many
investors participated in multiple rounds. As such, we
effectively ended up observing only one history of
prices and choices. Independent replication, with a
different cohort of managers and investors, is needed.
Second, part of our setup was unrealistic, but this
was done deliberately to isolate the effects of compe-
tition for fund flows when investors could allocate
wealth across multiple managers. Further experiments
should relax some of our assumptions. In particular, we
assumed a very simple management fee structure. One
can imagine theory and tests about joint determination
of fee and portfolio structure. We leave this and other
extensions for future work.
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